I propose a physical underpinning of the uncertainty relations (and with them, of quantum probabilities) which is dynamical, finitist, operational and objective. Under this view which dispels of the metaphysics that surrounds the quantum state or the "wave particle duality", quantum probabilities are objective dynamical transition probabilities between finite resolution measurement results. As such they can qualify as an objective alternative to the subjective view that the quantum information theoretic approach adheres to.
Chance and Subjectivity
Despite the so called "quantum revolution", determinism is still the working hypothesis of modern physics. When it comes to our physical theories, the mathematical requirement for existence and uniqueness of solutions to the initial conditions, irrespective of the the dynamical model that is used to describe the phenomena, is, and has been since the inception of mathematical physics, the first consistency test that such a model must This subjective interpretation of probability is natural in the context of classical statistical mechanics (SM henceforth), where a physical state is represented as a point on phase space, and the dynamics is a trajectory in that space, or in the context of Bohmian mechanics, where the state and the history are still a point and a trajectory, respectively (but phase space is replaced with a configuration space and the dynamics is augmented with the quantum potential). Recently it has been suggested as a viable option also in the context of orthodox non-relativistic quantum mechanics (QM henceforth), where the state is represented as a ray in the Hilbert space, and the dynamics is a unitary transformation, i.e., a rotation, in that space (e.g., [18] ). All three cases share a strictly deterministic dynamics, but differ on the representation of the physical state and on the formal representation of probabilities: in classical SM or Bohmian mechanics probabilities are subsets of phase space (or configuration space) obeying a Boolean structure [33] ; in QM they are angles between subspaces in the Hilbert space obeying a non-Boolean structure [66] , whence nonlocality, contextuality, and the violation of Bell's inequalities.
The subjective interpretation of probability in statistical physics appears to many inappropriate. The problem is not how lack of knowledge can bring about physical phenomena ( [4] , p. 64); it can't. Neither is it a problem about antirealism [35] or ontological vagueness [7] . Rather, the problem is that a subjective interpretation of probability in statistical physics, be it classical SM or QM, turns these theories into a type of statistical inference, and infects physics with a radical variant of dualism: while applied to physical systems, these theories become theories about epistemic judgments in the light of incomplete knowledge, and the probabilities therein do not represent or influence the physical situation, but only represent our state of mind, or degrees of belief [30, 77] .
That probability signifies subjective degree of belief and not an objective feature of the world, was famously argued by de Finetti, who also insisted that "probability doesn't exist" (this striking motto is reported on the memorial tablet at his birthplace in Innsbruck, Austria). Here's a typical quote:
It does not help me at all to give the name probability to the limiting frequencies, or to any other objective entity, if the connection between these considerations and the subjective judgements which depend on them remain subjective . . . It is for these reasons that the theory of probability ought not be considered as auxiliary theory for the branches of science which have not yet discovered the deterministic mechanism that "must" exist; instead it ought to be regarded as constituting the logical premises of all reasoning by induction. [20] , p. 150; 156 There is a lot to admire in the attempt to impose rationality and structure on our beliefs -irrational and messy as they may seem, but such a view that confines the interpretation of probabilistic statements in statistical physics to the subjective realm, and regards probability theory as an extension of inductive logic, leads to some awkward consequences.
Think of a probabilistic statement such as "there is 50% chance of rain at the DC area tomorrow", based on a some dynamical model of the weather. On the subjective account of probability, this statement can only mean that if one would have done a random sampling of the population at the DC area, and asked them what is their belief about the weather tomorrow, around half of the subjects would answer they believed it would rain. So apart from telling us that we should expect a certain ratio of umbrellas at any given train in the DC subway tomorrow, we learn very little from this statement about the physical state of the weather. In other words, if probability and chance are not features of the physical world, then contrary to what their practitioners and proprietors may think, the said dynamical models of the weather -indeed, statistical physics in general -do not describe this world, but rather our beliefs, or states of mind.
This tension between the deterministic character of the dynamics that underly statistical physics and the subjective interpretation of probability as a measure of the observer's ignorance presents the statistical physicists with the following dilemma, which for lack of a better word we shall here call "the observer dilemma":
OBSERVER : Either the observer is a part of the physical world, or she isn't. If she is, then her measure of ignorance may be part of the formalism which describes this world, but then must also signify a physical feature of this world; if she isn't, then her measure of ignorance need not represent any physical feature of the world, but also cannot be a part of a formalism which describes it.
The subjectivist, it seems, would like to have it both ways, and this explains the current schizophrenia in statistical physics regarding probability and the place of the observer in physics, manifest, e.g., in the famous confusion between Bohr and Pauli on the notion of "detached observer" ( [64] , pp. [43] [44] [45] [46] [47] [48] . See [31] , pp. 130-134): on one hand we have a view of physics which includes a "participating observer", whose subjective perspective becomes an inevitable part of the objective physical description, and on the other hand, a view of subjective probability as signifying nothing but the degree of credence of a detached observer, which have no room in an objective physical description.
The purpose of this contribution is to offer a dynamical, objective, interpretation of probability that avoids the Observer dilemma within a deterministic background. To do so we shall first look at a recent interpretation of QM, the Bayesian approach, that nicely exemplifies this dilemma. We shall then turn to a common alternative interpretation of probability in statistical physics, that claims to avoid the Observer dilemma by detaching probability from the deterministic dynamics. Exposing this alternative's faults we shall then offer a desiderata for any interpretation of probability that can escape the dilemma, and suggest a sketch of such an interpretation that goes back to Heisenberg's and Dirac's intuitions in 1926 on the meaning of quantum probabilities and the physical foundations of the uncertainty principle. The new interpretation, or so I shall argue, could serve as an objective alternative to the subjective approach to probability of the Bayesian approach.
What Is Wrong with Quantum Bayesianism?
Quantum Bayesianism is based on an epistemic attitude according to which the quantum state |ψ (the amplitude mod square of which, |ψ| 2 , is, after Max Born, interpreted as probability), does not represent a real physical state of a system, but instead supplies an observer with statistical information concerning all possible distributions of measurement results for all possible measurements. The probabilities computed by the standard Born rule are understood as probabilities of finding the system on measurement in some specific state, or, better yet, they represent betting rules for the observer on the possible results of future experiments. Applying von Neumann's projection postulate to the quantum state (or more generally applying Lüder's rule), under this account, is just an adjustment of subjective probabilities, conditionalizing on newly discovered results of measurement, i.e., it is merely a change in the observer's knowledge, or probability assignments. By contrast, the unitary and linear quantum mechanical dynamics describes the observer-independent and in this sense objective time evolution of the quantum probabilities when no measurement takes place. Hence, in this approach measurements can be treated operationally as 'black boxes' and require no further theoretical analysis.
Also here the tension between the deterministic (Schrödinger) dynamics and the probabilistic statements the theory allows us to formulate is resolved by detaching the former from the latter. Also here there is a lot to admire in the attempt to endow our beliefs about the results of physical experiments the kind of rational structure -which in the quantum case is also non-Boolean -that the Bayesian is so proud of. And also here the problem is that such an attempt turns out to be incomplete at best, or worse, inconsistent, since there is a certain type of experiments, possible in principle, for which this approach cannot give a unique prediction.
Think of the following thought experiment which a variant on Wigner's friend [85] . In this set-up an observer A measures the z-spin of a spin-half particle P by means of a Stern-Gerlach apparatus (which, to keep things simple, we omit from our description below). The quantum state of P + A initially is
where |α| 2 +|β| 2 = 1 (α, β = 0), the kets |± z are the z−spin eigenstates and |ψ 0 is the initial ready state of A. After the measurement, in a no-collapse theory, the quantum mechanical state of P + A is the superposition:
where |see up A and |see down A are, say, the brain states of A corresponding to her perceptions and memories of the two possible outcomes of the measurement. By contrast, in a collapse theory of the GRW kind, the state (2) is highly unstable (assuming that the chain of interactions leading to A's different memory states involves macroscopically distinguishable position states), so that by the time the measurement is complete this state collapses onto one of its components. Consider now an observableÔ of the composite system P + A of which the state (2) is an eigenstate with some definite eigenvalue, say +1. Observables likeÔ are defined in the tensor product Hilbert space H P ⊗ H A unless superselection rules are introduced. For our purposes think ofÔ as an observable that pertains to P 's spin degree of freedom and the relevant degrees of freedom of A's sense organs, perceptions, memory, etc.
Suppose now that the composite system P + A is completely isolated from the environment, and that a measurement ofÔ is about to be carried out on P + A immediately after the state (2) obtains. According to nocollapse QM the measurement ofÔ, under these circumstances, is completely non-disturbing in the sense that after the measurement the state of P +A remains precisely as in (2) . One may think ofÔ as an observable that is maximally sensitive to whether or not the interference terms between the different components of (2) exist. In other words, the measurement of O on P + A if the state (2) is the true state of P + A is a non-demolition measurement that, as it were, passively verifies whether or not P + A is in fact in that state.
Note thatÔ commutes neither with the z−spin nor with A's perceptions and memories of the outcomes of the z−spin measurement. This surely raises interesting questions about the status of the uncertainty relations in this set up and about the reliability of A's memories of the outcome of her spin measurement in the event that A measuresÔ just after her spin measurement. However, no matter what happens during the measurement ofÔ (to A's memory of the outcome of her spin measurement, or to the z−spin values themselves) QM implies that the correlations between the z−spin of P and A's memories must remain exactly the same as they were before theÔ-measurement. Moreover, in a no-collapse theory, the state of P + A immediately after theÔ-measurement will be, with complete certainty, just:
where |seeÔ = +1 is the state corresponding to perceiving the result of theÔ-measurement. By contrast, in a collapse theory the state of P + A immediately after thê O-measurement will be given by one of the eigenstates ofÔ, where the probability that it will be state (2), and therefore that the outcomeÔ = +1 will be obtained, is only |α| 2 . Note that even if that outcome will obtain, the state (2) will extremely quickly collapse, again, onto one of the components of state (2) with probabilities that are given by |α| 2 and |β| 2 . So, in the GRW theory, the final value of the z−spin and the spin memory of A might be different before and after theÔ-measurement.
Note further that we deliberately do not specify here who carries out theÔ-measurement (i.e., in which degree of freedom the outcomeÔ = +1 is recorded). It may be carried out by A or by some other observer B external to A's laboratory. As can be seen from our notation in (3), we have implicitly assumed (for the sake of simplicity only) that the outcomes of A's spin measurement and of theÔ-measurement are recorded in separate degrees of freedom. But in fact our argument below does not depend on this assumption. QM itself imposes no restrictions whatsoever on the way in which the outcomes of these measurements are recorded, except that they cannot be recorded simultaneously in the same degree of freedom (since σ z ⊗ 1 as well as A's memory observable are incompatible withÔ). Moreover, QM (with or without collapse) imposes no further restrictions on the identity of the observers who may or may not carry outÔ-type measurements. 1 To make things simple, let us suppose that theÔ-measurement is to be carried out by the external observer B. But now we can ask A to give her predictions of the probabilities of the outcomes of theÔ-measurement (clearly, in QM the quantum state assigned to a system is supposed to give the probabilities of the outcomes for all possible measurements). But here we encounter a problem in the Bayesian approach since it doesn't tell us on what quantum state should A base her predictions! In order to calculate her expected probabilities, A may choose one of the following two options: (a) Update her quantum state in accordance with the outcome of the spin measurement she actually observed, either |see up A or |see down A . In this case, she would collapse the state (2) onto one of its components (i.e., spin+memory). Applying the Born rule to this state, she will predict that the result of theÔ-measurement will be +1 with probability |α| 2 .
(b) Ignore the outcome of the spin measurement she actually observed, and conditionalize her probabilities on the uncollapsed state as in (2) . In this case, since the state in (2) is an eigenstate ofÔ with eigenvalue +1, she will predict that the result of theÔ-measurement will be +1 with certainty (i.e., probability 1).
Note, however, that since the Bayesian does not know whether or not post-measurement states of the form (2) actually collapse, she does not know which of these two predictions is correct. But, surely, they cannot be both true, since they are inconsistent. And, even more embarrassing for the Bayesian, by carrying out a series of repeatedÔ-measurements on identically prepared systems, all in state (2), we can distinguish experimentally between these two predictions, (a) or (b), which means that quantum Bayesianism is an incomplete story that cannot account for experiments that quantum theory tells us are possible in principle.
A Bayesian would probably raise the objection that there is no harm in assigning different degrees of belief to the same situation when one has different amount of knowledge to begin with, but the point to be made here is that, while there is plainly a fact of the matter about the correct result of the experiment, the Bayesian approach gives no plausible account of which option -(a) or (b) -is the correct one.
On the one hand, the full information about the lab available to A before theÔ-measurement is given by the collapsed state, and this justifies option (a). On the other hand, if A knows QM under the Bayesian approach, then she believes that there is no real collapse of the state in measurement, and so her predictions ought to be guided in this case by the uncollapsed state as in (2) . That is, on this view option (b) is justified. So, according to the Bayesian view, the two predictions seem to be on equal footing.
What our thought experiment above shows is that once we treat measurements operationally, and probability as epistemic, or subjective, then the assignment of quantum states becomes (in some circumstances) ambiguous, and this ambiguity leads to incompatible probability assignments to measurement outcomes! And while there is nothing inconsistent in having different predictions based on different amounts of information, once we remind ourselves that these predictions actually refer to matters of fact in the world, we must, as it were, make up our mind which prediction is correct and which is not; they cannot be both true. 2 It is important to note that this muddle is a direct result of the two ingredients that make up the Observer dilemma: on one hand the Bayesian wants to keep the deterministic quantum dynamics in tact; on the other hand she insists on interpreting the probabilities that appear therein as purely subjective. That for a certain type of experiments the Bayesian cannot give a definite prediction only means that she is bound by our dilemma: by interpreting probability as purely subjective she cannot tie it back to the actual state of affairs in the world, a state of affairs presumably described by the quantum dynamics.
Typicality
One way to go about interpreting probability as an objective feature of the world, notwithstanding the deterministic character of the dynamics that presumably describe it, is, no surprise, to detach the probabilities from the dynamics. On this view probabilities arise from some initial distribution of events on the space of all possible events, or, in the dynamical context, from some distribution of initial conditions on phase space. Once endowed with this distribution at time t 0 , the deterministic dynamics takes over, "carrying the probability" with the dynamical flow to any other time t > t 0 . Probabilities thus enter once and only once in the beginning of the universe, and our current probabilistic statements reflect the initial distribution with which our universe came equipped. This view is known today as Typicality:
The probabilities here are independent of the dynamical laws. If one is looking at a finite volume v of state space, there will almost always be multiple trajectories coming out of it and leading in different directions. Some will go up and some will go down, and to form expectations, one needs to know how many of a typical finite set of systems whose states begin in v go this way and how many go that. If one wants to know the probability that a system whose initial state falls in v is in v * after an interval I, that is to say, she calculates the probability that a random pick from a typical ensemble of systems whose states begin in v, end in v * . Dynamical laws that specify only what the physically possible trajectories will not yield these probabilities. And so where there is more than one possibility, dynamical laws will not specify how to divide opinion among them.
[49], p. 95
Typicality as a view of objective deterministic chance has been defended both in the foundations of classical SM and in the context of Bohmian mechanics (e.g., [59] ). This seems natural, given the above premise of the typicality approach, namely, the premise according to which the (deterministic) dynamics are irrelevant to the notion of probability; all that matters is the instantaneous representation of the state of the physical system, and, as a matter of fact, modulo the wave function, this representation of the physical state (as a point in phase space or as a point configuration space) is identical in classical SM and Bohmian mechanics.
Typicality claims tell us what most physical states are, or which dynamical evolutions (trajectories on phase space) are overwhelmingly more likely, by assigning measure 1 to the set of such states or the set of such dynamical evolutions. Examples are "most quantum states are mixed, i.e., entangled with their environment", or "most systems relax to thermodynamic equilibrium if left to themselves". Such claims make an analytical connection between a deterministic dynamics and a characterization of certain empirical distributions, hence can be interpreted as objective, having nothing to do with one's credence or state of knowledge. With this notion, or so the story goes, one can treat probabilistic statements in a deterministic physical theories as arising from an objective state of affairs, and the theories that give rise to these statements as theories about the physical world, rather than theories about our state of mind.
How would the typicality approach to probability interpret statements such as "there is 50% chance of rain at the DC area tomorrow"? On this approach, what this statement means is that, so far, in 50% of days macroscopically similar to today, it rained the next day at the DC area. Note that in order to render probability objective according to this view, an initial distribution is not sufficient; what is needed in addition is an agreed upon separation between a micro-description and macro-description, and a specific choice of macro-states, usually on the basis of some agreed upon notion of macroscopic similarity.
This objective view of probability, however, is still controversial, as it is saturated with many difficulties.
First, as its proponents admit [32] , the notion of typicality is too weak: a theorem saying that a condition is true of the vast majority of systems does not prove anything about a concrete given system. Next, the notion lacks logical closure: a pair of typical states is not necessarily a typical pair of states, which means that "being typical" is not an intrinsic property of an initial condition, not even for a single system, but depends on the relation between the state and other possible initial conditions [69] . Possible ways around these difficulties have been suggested; Maudlin ([59] , p. 287), for example, rejects the requirement to assign probabilities to single systems, and Pitowsky [69] proposes to retain most of the advantages of typicality but to retreat to a full-fledged Lebesgue measure, with its combinatorial interpretation. But while these problems may be circumvented, there are three deeper lacunas underlying the notion of typicality which threatens the entire project.
The first point is that typicality claims depend on a specific choice of measure, usually the Lebesgue measure or any other measure absolutely continuous with it, and another choice of a uniform distribution relative to that measure. Yet classical phase space is an uncountable set, isomorphic to R 6N (where N is the number of degrees of freedom of the system at hand), and as such, there are infinitely many ways to endow it with a measure that can serve as a probability measure relative to which we can count points in that space. What criteria should one employ in order to choose such a measure and such a uniform distribution? and what justifies this choice of measure when an infinite number of possible measures are equally plausible?
A famous unsuccessful attempt to justify the choice of the Lebesgue measure and the uniform distribution relative to it in the foundations of SM is the ergodic approach (on this approach see, e.g., ( [73] and reference therein). In this framework one attempts to underwrite thermodynamics with mechanics by replacing the mechanical version of the law of approach to equilibrium with a probabilistic counterpart, derivable from the equations of motion. In special cases, namely when the dynamics is ergodic (i.e., when the only constant of motion is energy), equilibrium states are endowed with high probability, and so if a system started in a nonequilibrium state, it would, with certainty, approach equilibrium and remain there.
There are many objections to this approach (e.g., [12, 26] ), but the one most relevant to our story is that it is circular: the beautiful mathematical theorems, proven in this approach, apply only to a point-set of Lebesgue measure 1 on phase space; and yet the choice of the Lebesgue measure is exactly what these theorems are intended to justify in the first place.
Given this circularity, it seems best to adopt an empiricist stance [43] , and follow a strictly empirical criteria: the choice of measure should have empirical significance, to the extent that it ought to be testable, as any other statement of physics. Once we narrow down the search for empirically adequate measures that yield probabilities which are close enough to the observed relative frequencies, we select a measure according to convenience.
This simple rule may yield the measure that is often used in the foundations of SM (namely, the Lebesgue measure relative to which every microstate -a point in phase space -compatible with some macro-state -a delineated region of that space which represents some meaningful macroscopic physical magnitude -has equal weight), but the crucial point is that the arrow of justification for this choice starts in empirical adequacy: if we had evidence that the uniform distribution relative to that measure is not empirically adequate, we would have chosen a different measure and a different distribution! The moral, if there is one, is that questions about the choice of measure are empirical questions, not a priori ones. 3 The main difference between the typicality approach and the strictly empiricist one rests in the way both justify their choice in measure L. If one follows the latter, then one chooses measure L in accord with the observed relative frequencies of macro-states, that is, one makes an additional inductive leap, over and above the inductive leap that concerns the classical dynamical regularities. Since this choice is based on thermodynamic experience, it cannot justify our thermodynamic experience in a non-circular way (cf. the ergodic approach or the causal set approach above). But if, on the other hand, one attempts to explain our experience using measure L (by saying, e.g., that it has some aesthetic dynamical virtues such as being conserved by the dynamics, or other a priori virtues), then one ends up in a non-defensible position that ultimately involves circular reasoning.
One might attempt to promote the initial distribution to the status of a new physical law (e.g., [57] ), but such attempts are also doomed from the outset. A law of nature, however necessary and universal it may seem to be, presumably requires empirical evidence that can corroborate it, and thus can be overturned when contradicting evidence suddenly presents itself in domains yet to be tested. But according to the proponents of typicality, no amount of evidence can lead us to modify the initial distribution, and in particular no amount of dynamical evidence, i.e., competing dynamical laws, could do so, since this distribution is independent of any dynamical law, and is given to us only once.
The second problem is not unique to the typicality approach, but it is worth mentioning, as it emphasizes again the need for an empirical underpinning of the notion of probability. For even if we have established somehow that, relative to a preferred choice of measure, a certain set of states T n is typical, i.e., its members are overwhelmingly more probable with respect to all possible states, what justifies the claim that we are likely to observe, or "pick-up", members of that set T n more often than members of the complement set T ab ? After all, the measure we have imposed on the space of all possible potential states (T n ∩ T ab ) need not dictate the measure we impose on the space of our actual observations; we could just as well toss a fair coin and endow observations of members of both T n and T ab with equal probability. This point is quite general and equally applies to QM: under the choice of the Haar measure (the analogue of the Lebesgue measure in SM), "most" states in the Hilbert space are mixed, hence entangled with their environment, but we can still realize (hence observe) pure states in the lab, at least to a certain extent. In what sense, then, are these states "rare", or abnormal?
The idea, known as practical (or moral) certainty, according to which events with small probability on the space of all possible events are correspondingly rare on the space of actual events hence are unlikely to occur, is prevalent in all account of probability, e.g., Bernouli's, Laplace's and Kolmogorov's, to name a few, and goes back to Leibniz ( [34] , p 146). But also here we have a problem in justifying the measure we impose on the space of actual events, that assigns high probability to those events with high measure on the space of possible events. As in the case of the choice of the measure above, nothing but induction alone, i.e., empirical generalizations, allow us to assign low probability to the occurrence of "unlikely events" (unlikely in terms of their probability on phase space). For all we know, the next occurrence could be an occurrence of exactly such an "unlikely event", and we would have been wrong all along in our probability assignment. Some (e.g., [59] , p. 277) call such a possibility "a cosmic run of bad luck", but no matter how one choses to call this situation, the fact still remain that nothing in the physical laws forbids it from holding in our world.
The twofold problem of justification of the measure is, on final account, another facet of the problem of induction ( [65] , pp. 234-238). On a strictly empiricist view, the effort to justify typicality claims with a priori considerations is just another (futile) attempt to give demonstrations to matters of fact, or to derive contingent conclusions from necessary truths. The point here is that there is no surrogate for experience in the empirical sciences, and that inductive reasoning is the best one can do in one's attempts to understand the world. A definition of objective probability should therefore be susceptible to such an empirical investigation, and rely on few a priori notions as possible.
The third and final problem stems from the fact that in the typicality approach, probabilities are postulated only once as a distribution on the initial conditions, and therefore the dynamics play no role in their definition or calculation. While such an attitude might be defended on the basis of the common view about the incompatibility between determinism and objective probability, it also leads to some bizarre consequences. Think of a gas which is at t 0 compressed into a small volume of a cylinder with a valve. Once the valve is removed, the gas starts to expand until it fills up the cylinder. Mundane as this example is, the typicality approach gets it all wrong: according to this approach, in any given moment t > t 0 the probability that the gas fills the cylinder is practically 1, but of course, the process in which the gas fills the cylinder takes time; depending on this relaxation time, the prediction that one would find the gas in equilibrium in t > t 0 may be true or false. And yet according to the typicality approach, it is always true, no matter what t is.
Desiderata
Thus far we have seen that the common view, based as it is on the premise that if the dynamics is deterministic, probabilities must either be subjective, or, if construed objectively, they must be detached from the dynamics, is problematic and yields awkward situations : if one construes probability as an objective static feature of the world, one ends up in giving the wrong predictions in many cases of relaxation to thermal equilibrium; if one construes probability as a subjective feature, one ends up in giving ambiguous predictions in possible interference experiments even though there is a fact of the matter regarding the result thereof; and one is unable to account in any physical terms for a difference that one's own theory admits to exist between different physical states.
But why should one entertain this premise to begin with? There is no a priori reason to do so, and, as we have just seen, it leads to insurmountable problems. 4 In the remaining of this chapter I shall try to sketch what an alternative to this common view could look like.
The first conceptual shift required, notwithstanding determinism, is to construe the notion of physical probability as an objective dynamical feature of the world; objective physical probability should be seen as a transition probability from one state to another, and not merely as a distribution imposed on the initial conditions, "carried along" with the dynamics irrespective thereof.
Next, a lot of ink has been spilled on devising ingenious arguments, all aiming to demonstrate that probabilities, defined either as a measure of credulity, or a measure of "size" on phase space, obey some a priori guidelines, be these rational, decision making, or aesthetic. But if physical probability is objective and dynamical, then any assumption about its origin must be contingent, derivable from some physical property which we can test, verify, and falsify. The sole criteria for such choice of measure is thus our experience, and the desire to reproduce the macroscopic, observable relative frequencies of everyday life.
Finally, the deterministic character of the dynamics, through the observer dilemma, constrain us to construe objective probability as a physical quantification of lack of knowledge, and not as a mere mental feature of the observer. One way to exorcise dualism and to go about fulfilling such a requirement is to regard "ignorance" or "lack of knowledge" as a measure of inaccuracy, an unavoidable consequence of limited resolution capability that can be quantified in precise physical and objective terms. This view of "lack of knowledge" as limited resolution allows us to interpret probabilities objectively as transition probabilities between any two measured physical states, while the dynamics between these states remain completely deterministic.
Probability, according to this new approach, should be seen as a physical, objective, and dynamical magnitude, which quantifies, in ways to be spelled out, the limited resolution power one has whan one attempts to acquire information about the world via measurements. In what follows we shall first demonstrate the plausibility of this alternative in classical SM, and hint on how it can also be applied to non relativistic QM.
Probability as a Dynamical Concept
Classical statistical mechanics is done on phase space, a multi-dimensional space spanned by the positions and momenta of the particles which the physical system consist of. The micro-state of the physical system in any given moment is a point on that space. The (actual and possible) histories, or time-evolutions, of that system are trajectories on that space. At the very least, one principle constrains these histories, and it represents the idea of Laplacian determinism, namely, existence and uniqueness of solutions to the dynamical equations. On phase space it is manifest (i) in the requirement that any two trajectories or histories never meet, and (ii) in the requirement (known as Liouville's theorem) that throughout the history of the system, the region in phase space occupied by its possible micro-states which are initially compatible with some (in general macroscopic) property, may change its shape, but not its volume.
Following a recent fresh outlook on the foundations of SM, let's call such a region, i.e., the set of micro-states that are initially compatible with some macroscopic property a dynamical blob (See [43] ). This shift in description from a point into a set of points, or a region, signifies the fact that unlike Maxwell's demon, we as human observers lack the resolution power to discriminate between possible micro-states, all of which are compatible with some macroscopic property. When these properties happen to designate meaningful physical magnitudes for creatures like us, given our correlations with the observed system, they are called macrostates, and the remarkable contingent fact is that their behavior, governed by the underlying dynamics and by the way we correlate with physical systems, shows the kind of macroscopic regularity that thermodynamics describes.
The departure from the common view starts with the subtle distinction, made in [43] , between the dynamical blob and the partitioning of phase space into macro-states, and results in the independence of these two basic notions: a dynamical blob may start as a macro-state, but during its timeevolution it may change its shape, so that different points in it may endup in different macro-states. After all, the partitioning of the accessible region in phase space into macro-states depends only on the correlations between the observer and the system, and is stationary.
How can one define probability as an objective, dynamical, feature in this context? If the dynamics is deterministic, probability can arise, or so the story goes, only from our ignorance of the exact state of the system. In the construction above, what determines the transition probability of a physical system from one macro-state to another is the partial overlap between the dynamical blob and the macro-state:
This means that the probability that a system that starts at a macro-state [M 0 ] at time t 1 will end in a macro-state [M 1 ] at time t 2 is given by the relative size µ of the dynamical blob B t 2 which overlaps with the macro-state [M 1 ]. Note that there is nothing subjective in this kind of transition probability. "Ignorance" here simply means lack of resolution power, which is expressed by the relation between dynamical blobs and macro-states, both of which are objective features of the physical world. Note also that in this construction, entropy and probability are two different concepts. The first, following Boltzmann, is a measure of the macro-state's size; the second is the measure of the partial overlap of the dynamical blob and the macro-state. The first measure is chosen based on empirical considerations relevant to thermodynamics; the second is chosen on the empirical basis of observed relative frequencies. It may happen that once the first measure is chosen, it will turn out to be the same as the second measure, but there is no reason to require it. Nevertheless, as a matter of fact, empirical generalizations tell us that it is highly probable for entropy to obey the laws of thermodynamics, such as the second law or the approach to equilibrium. In this context the interpretation of probability as a measure of resolution power becomes evident: in thermodynamics entropy designates the degree to which energy is exploitable to produce work; the higher the entropy, the less the energy is exploitable. Exploitability means degree of control, which in mechanics translates into resolution power, or degree of precision; one has less control on the actual micro-state of one's system when that actual micro-state belongs to a macro-state of a larger size. Similarly, if probability is defined dynamically as a transition of the microstate from one macro-state to another, a smaller probability means a less accurate resolution, in which µ, the overlap between the dynamical blob and the macro-state, is smaller.
The translation of this view of probability as a dynamical feature, a measure of inaccuracy of measurement in the transition from one state to another, to the quantum domain, may seem heretic. After all, there is a wide consensus that an unbridgable metaphysical gap exists between the quantum and the classical; that an ignorance interpretation of probability in the quantum world has been debunked by the violations of Bell's inequalities, and that there is no point in asking what is the physical meaning of the quantum state, hence the shift to quantum information. But, as we shall now see, this heretic translation is exactly what is needed in order to escape the Observer dilemma, and to endow quantum probabilities with objective, physical meaning.
As a matter of historical fact, a similar intuition was shared by Heisenberg and Dirac around 1926, during their attempt to supply an alternative to Schrödinger's Wave Mechanics, an attempt which led to the famous Uncertainty relations.
Historically, the motivation for Heisenberg's paper on the uncertainty relations was to establish the consistency of his Matrix Mechanics with the experimental data, data which Schrödinger's Wave Mechanics represented by means of continuously evolving causal processes in space and time. Both Heisenberg and Dirac were thus concerned as early as the fall of 1926 with the question of whether the formalism of the newly constructed quantum theory allowed for the position of a particle and its velocity to be determinable in a given moment in time ( [63] ; and [21] , p. 622-624). Their negative conclusion, enforced by intuitions they shared about spatial discreteness and non commutative geometry, has led to the common view of the uncertainty principle as a restrictive empirical principle, call it (U 1 ), that states: it is impossible to measure simultaneously position and momentum.
Heisenberg's presentation of the uncertainty relation was purely qualitative, but a complete mathematical formulation thereof soon appeared [51] , and was generalized by Robertson [70] :
This generalization -together with the one given by Schrödinger [72] -established the uncertainty relations as theorems of QM (for all normalized state vectors |ψ on the Hilbert space), but it differed in its status and its intended role from Heisenberg's original presentation. Rather than statements about empirical facts concerning measurements, the uncertainty relations were now considered as statements about the spreads of the probability distributions of the several physical quantities arising from the same state. For example, the uncertainty relation between the position and momentum of a system may be understood as the statement, call it (U 2 ): in any quantum state the position and momentum distributions spread cannot both be arbitrarily narrow. Inequality (2) is an example of such a relation in which the standard deviation is employed as a measure of spread. A recent analysis has exposed the shortcomings of this representation, offering some more suitable measures of spread [44, 47, 78] . Part of Heisenberg's reasoning in defending (U 1 ) was the attempt to show, by way of his famous Gamma-ray microscope thought experiment, that the inability of QM to precisely discern both momentum and position of a particle is consistent with the optimum accuracy obtainable in experimental measurements. On this view, the reason for the uncertainty relations was to be found in the semi-classical analysis of the measurement interaction. This interaction, when combined with Einstein-de Broglie relations (which relate wavelength to momentum via Planck's constant), involves a scattering process between a photon and a material body, say, an electron, and results in the latter's changing its momentum discontinuously, in a manner inverse proportional to the wavelength of the photon. This reasoning has led to yet another formulation of the uncertainty principle, call it (U 3 ): it is impossible to measure position of a particle without subsequently disturbing its momentum, and vice versa.
The history of the reasoning behind (U 3 ) is well-known: Bohr, for one, saw it yet as another indication that the uncertainty relations in particular, and QM in general, are ultimately based on wave-particle duality, or complementarity [50] , and a debate between him and Heisenberg ensued on the precedence of these principles as foundational principles of QM over the bare mathematical formalism. Setting aside this debate, which belongs to the folklore of the Copenhagen interpretation (e.g., [8] , ch. 11), two issues here remain central to this paper. First, it is noteworthy that while Heisenberg was concerned with measurement "error" or "disturbance", the connections of these with the notion of standard deviation is not straightforward [46] , and so, without further qualifications, (U 3 ) does not follow from, or entails, (U 2 ). Second, and even more important, Heisenberg's microscope thought experiment, and the "disturbance" view associated with it, consist of an alternative to Born's statistical interpretation of the state vector [11] , or to Jordan's version of quantum theory [25] , as yet another context where probabilities enter into the formalism of QM. At that time, recall, the founding fathers of QM were indecisive with respect to the statistical character of the theory. Jordan and Born, for example, kept open the possibility that nature is intrinsically indeterministic. In contrast, both Heisenberg and Dirac held to the belief that nature's dynamics is deterministic. But while Born's statistical interpretation designated the square of the amplitude of a stationary state vector as the probability that the system is in that state, Dirac ([21] , p. 641) and Heisenberg ([42] , p. 62), identified the statistical element of QM only in the context of experiments, or observations, where transitions from one state to another occur:
One can, like Jordan, say that the laws of nature are statistical. But one can also, and that to me seems considerably more profound, say with Dirac that all statistics are brought in only through our experiments. That we do not know at which position the electron will be the moment of our experiment, is, in a manner of speaking, only because we do not know the phases, if we do know the energy . . . and in this respect the classical theory would be no different. That we cannot come to know the phases without . . . destroying the atom is characteristic of QM. This idea is also manifest in Heisenberg's remark that "the uncertainty relation doesnt refer to the past" ( [41] , p. 20) , that is, the uncertainty relation should be interpreted as the inability to measure both the current position and the future momentum of a particle. The problem with this view was that, similarly to (U 3 ), without an objective alternative thereto, the transition probabilities it involves were commonly interpreted as purely subjective and epistemic, representing as they were the lack of knowledge of the observer, whose measurement "disturbs" a pre-existing value [79] . Yet the existence of such definite, classical values, that remain unknown due to dynamical limits of experiments (or due to the quantum nature of the measurement process) is usually (e.g., [14] ), taken to be in conflict with the confirmed violations of Bell's inequalities [5] and with famous "no hidden-variables" proofs [52] . In other words, the idea that the measurement "disturbs" the quantum state is rejected by the common belief that there exists a deep metaphysical difference between quantum and classical mechanics. And yet, since the meaning of objective physical probabilities, or so I shall argue, in both SM and QM is the same, namely, it quantifies the lack of resolution power in a physical measurement, then there is no point in looking for such a metaphysical difference between the two theories. But that there exists no qualitative metaphysical difference doesn't mean there exists no difference at all. And so in order to defend an objective, dynamical, transition probability in non relativistic QM within a deterministic framework (i.e., without collapse), we need to establish some nonmetaphysical difference between the two theories, at least with respect to the probabilities they employ. In particular, we need to establish a quantitative difference, not a qualitative one.
And as it turns out, Heisenberg and Dirac have already touched upon such a difference back in 1926.
Discreteness
The speculation that QM in general, and the uncertainty principle in particular, militate against the spatial continuum was voiced early on by Einstein [36, 74] , and was toyed with -to varying degrees of seriousness -by at least two other major players in the history of quantum theory, namely, Dirac and Heisenberg. Among the two, Heisenberg was the most vocal, and is also well-known for his lifelong search for minimal length [17, 53] . In a letter to Pauli from 11/15/1926 he writes:
. . .[i]f it ends up that space-time is somehow discontinuous, then it will really be very satisfying that it wouldn't make sense to talk about, e.g., velocityẋ [the first derivative of position -AH] at a certain point x. Because in order to define velocity, one needs at least 2 points, which, in a discontinuum-world, just can not lie infinitely close [ Dirac was less explicit, but it is by now well-documented that his work was influenced by ideas consistent with the hypothesis of finite spatial resolution, e.g., finitist and operational ideas such as Whitehead's method of extensive abstraction, or the geometrical interpretation of non commutativity [19] . The latter was for Dirac the most distinctive feature of the new quantum theory that separated it from the classical one (e.g., [22] . Dirac was also well aware of the methodological problems that accompanied the notion of a finite spatial resolution (e.g., the loss of relativistic causality at short distances), but wasn't as worried about these problems as his contemporaries were. This attitude is evident in his solution to the problem of the self-energy of the classical electron, which introduces a finite electron radius [23] , in his interpretation of this cutoff as an inherent feature of spacetime (and not just as a limit on the theory's applicability), and in his famous and persistent criticism of the renormalization method [24] .
In the late 1920s only few physicists, motivated by finitist, operationalist, and relationalist views, were concerned with the limitations on spatial resolution in a single experiment, and relied on the Compton effect to exemplify their point, by drawing on Heisenberg's Gamma-ray microscope thought experiment (e.g., [71, 82] . For a comprehensive account see [37] , chapter 4 and references therein). As such, these ideas succumb to the criticism of the epistemic interpretation of the uncertainty relations, but they also contain the basic element for its alternative, namely, the assumption that in any physical interaction the momentum transfer between any two physical entities is finite and bounded from above. This cutoff on momentum which limits the spatial resolution of any position measurement was central to the development of the notion of fundamental length in field theories, and is the key to the understanding of the uncertainty relations in a non epistemic, physical, and objective sense.
The idea to introduce a cutoff to the momentum transfer in particle collision was first suggested by Wataghin [83, 84] , and later elaborated by March [58] . Both physicists were trying to eliminate the divergences that plagued the newly born quantum electrodynamics (QED), and in particular the self-energy of the electron, which originated from the notion of a point-coupling, due to which the theory was forced to admit waves of an arbitrary small wavelengths [81] . One way to limit the number of waves was to remove the effectiveness of those waves with a frequency exceeding a certain limit. To this end what served as an appropriate principle was the introduction of a new universal constant l 0 , that, analogously to and c, limits in principle the ability of observation, to the extent that one could not ascertain the position of a particle at rest with a greater accuracy than with a possible error l 0 .
The fundamental length l 0 was introduced relativistically into the interaction Hamiltonian between the field and the particle as the minimal radius of a sphere, below which no interaction takes place. The alteration of the interaction Hamiltonian was done in such a way that momentum was always conserved. Consequently, the corresponding matrix element for, e.g., an absorption of a photon by an electron which is initially at rest for wavelength λ l 0 remained unchanged, but for λ l 0 it was reduced to one-half the classical value. For emission the result was that an electron at rest was incapable of transmitting photons with wavelength smaller than l 0 .
From these corrections to the interaction Hamiltonian, March ([58] , p. 277) concluded that it was impossible to distinguish the positions of two particles by means of a diffraction experiment performed with light rays, if the distance between them was less than l 0 . In such an experiment, a radiation would be required with a wavelength the order of magnitude of which would correspond to the distance to be measured. The zeropoint energy divergence was now eliminated because waves with λ l 0 could not be reflected from the walls of the cavity in which the radiation is enclosed, as neither free, nor fixed, electrons were able to deflect a photon by a finite angle.
It is noteworthy that, at least during the 1930s, physicists who introduced minimal length into field theories with the above method of a high momentum cutoff remained agnostic about the structure of spacetime, and interpreted the inability to resolve distances smaller than the minimal length as the limit of applicability of the theory. Such agnosticism was natural given the problems one encountered when trying to translate the (upper) bound on momentum space into a (lower) bound on position space, problems that include, among other things, breakdown of relativis-tic causality and tension with Lorentz' invariance.
Apart from the reliance on set-ups such as Heisenberg's Gamma-ray thought experiment, the connection between the limit on spatial resolution and the "disturbance" view of the uncertainty principle is also apparent from the famous debate on the epistemic coherence of QED. In 1931 Landau and Peierls argued [54] that the newly born QED was epistemically incoherent as its precluded its own verification by allowing singularities (situations in which the theory gave no predictions) even in single measurements of field quantities. As was later shown by Bohr and Rosenfeld [10] , one could restore epistemic coherence to the theory and eliminate the singularities, if one accepted that physical magnitudes should be defined not at a dimensionless spatial point, but rather in a finite extended spatial volume. The same reasoning was generalized in the late 1930s [13] , and later during the 1950s [60] , to include measurements of the gravitational field, and is part of the prehistory of quantum gravity (see [37] , chapter 5).
This role of the limit on spatial resolution as eliminating singularities and restoring epistemic coherence to a given theory is quite general, but still goes widely unappreciated. Take, for instance, Bohmian Mechanics, which reproduces Born's rule (hence the statistical predictions of non relativistic QM) under the assumption of uniform probability distribution relative to the Lebesgue measure imposed on the initial conditions in 3-space [33] . A question arises -but is rarely asked -regarding the subset of these initial conditions situated on the surface whose width is of measure zero and which separates 3-space into two equal halves. 6 Bohmian mechanics seems to give no predictions about the results of any experiment done on a physical system whose initial state belongs to the above subset (the same situation can also arise in collapse interpretations of non relativistic QM). Clearly, if position cannot be resolved with actual infinite precision in principle in any measurement, then singularities are eliminated, and epistemic coherence is restored. 7 We shall return to this point in section 9, as this generality -i.e., the fact that the epistemic coherence of any theory coincides with the limit on spatial resolution, regardless of the metaphysical view involved -is key to the alternative to the "disturbance" view of the uncertainty principle we shall now turn to.
Uncertainty
It is quite remarkable that the empirical status of the uncertainty relations is far from being experimentally confirmed even today [16] . Lacking an empirical underpinning, the standard view of the uncertainty relations sees them either as a mathematical theorem of the formalism of QM [70] , or as a manifestation of Bohr's ideas on wave-particle duality and complementarity [50] . Heisenberg's attempt to physically motivate the uncertainty relations with a thought experiment that depicted them as arising from a "disturbance" inherent to the act of measurement has been widely criticized as untenable [14] , the common view being that this line of reasoning lends support to an epistemic, hidden-variables, interpretation of QM [79] , which stands in conflict with the confirmed violations of Bell's inequalities [5] and with famous "no hidden-variables" proofs.
Here we shall suggest a different physical underpinning of these relations that is immune to the above criticism, and that instead relies on two simple assumptions:
(a) It is in principle impossible to perform a position measurement with infinite precision.
(b) Every measurement can be reduced to (or construed as) position measurement.
Assumption (a) follows from a the hypothesis of finite nature (see, e.g., [27] , p. 57 or [29] , p. 255). Note that, as a matter of fact, assumption (a) is consistent with any position measurement we have ever made. That assumption (b) is plausible follows from the fact that a well-known theory, namely Bohmian Mechanics, is empirically indistinguishable from non relativistic QM. Relying on a stronger version of assumption (b) as it does, namely, that every physical property ontologically supervenes on position, 8 Bohmian mechanics nevertheless reproduces the Born rule under an initial equilibrium assumption (i.e., a uniform probability distribution in position space). Consequently, any counterexample to assumption (b) would automatically be a counterexample to the applicability of non relativistic QM. Indeed, in his Path Integral formulation of QM, Feynman famously states that "a theory formulated in terms of position measurements is complete enough in principle to describe all phenomena" ( [28] , p. 96). John Stewart Bell is yet another physicist who promoted assumption (b) on many occasions (e.g., [6] , p. [52] [53] [54] [55] [56] [57] [58] [59] [60] [61] [62] .
To see how these two assumptions physically underpin the uncertainty principle let's take the mathematical formulation thereof which dispenses with standard deviation as an inadequate measure of spread of the probability distribution, and replaces it with more appropriate measures of spread (see [44, 78, 46] ). Consistent with Heisnberg's intuition above, in this formulation the uncertainty relation represents the inability to measure both the current position and the future momentum of a particle. In the context of Heisenberg's microscope thought experiment it can be written as ( [48] , p. 133):
where C is a constant of order unity. Relation (6) connects the resolving power of the measuring apparatus (w x ) with the predictability of the momentum of the measured object after the measurement (W p ). Mathematically, the former magnitude is the width of the wave function of the state of the object in position space, that represents how far is that state from a spatially translated copy of itself [47] . The latter magnitude is the overall width of the wave function of the state in momentum space; it represents how narrow is the probability distribution of momentum, i.e., how small is the inaccuracy in its prediction. By assumption (a) the first magnitude (w x ) is finite; by assumptions (b) and (a) -since we actually measure position when we measure momentum -the second magnitude (W p ) can be construed as representing spatial resolution hence is also finite. We can physically justify relation (6) once we realize that the momentum measurement depends in its accuracy on the (finite) accuracy of the earlier position measurement, and vice versa (see fn. ??). Note that, in accordance with our goal to propose an objective notion of uncertainty and probability, this underpinning also replaces Heisenberg's intuition about the uncertainty arising from "disturbance" -in this case the disturbance of the momentum of the particle by the position measurement -with an objective, "hidden-variable-free" notion of uncertainty that arises from an inherent limitation on spatial resolution: the point is that nowhere does this view involve the actual (but presumably unknown) state of the particle; what is being "disturbed", or modified, is the consecutive measurement, whose accuracy is inversely proportional to the accuracy of its alternate measurement.
So much for non commutativity. What about interference? for this consider the proverbial double slit experiment, where interference is explicitly addressed. Bohr famously argued ( [9] , p. 25) that the attempt to discern which slit the particle went through "destroys" the interference pattern on the photographic plate. If one considers Bohr's set-up [48] , one notes that the detection of the slit the particle went through relies on the recoil of the slitted screen due to the passage of the particle in that slit. This recoil sets an upper bound on the initial knowledge of the momentum of the movable screen: for this recoil to be distinguishable, the initial momentum of the screen along the y-direction (the direction perpendicular to the flight of the particle) must be known with an uncertainty no bigger than the same momentum recoil.
Next, Bohr's reasoned that this upper bound in momentum imposes, via the uncertainty relation, a lower bound on the overall width of the wave function in position space, which is greater than the width of the interference band, and that if one attempts to detect the path of the particle, the interference vanishes. While Bohr's reasoning was incorrect, 9 his conclusion was right! This conclusion, namely, that the conditions under which a measurement that allows the distinction of the two paths the particle could have gone through exclude the conditions under which interference can be observed, is demonstrated succinctly in [48] , pp. 135-136 and [45] , where the appropriate width (or measurement resolution) which relates the interference pattern to the distinguishability of the two momentum states of a movable screen (associated with the passage of the particle in one slit or the other) is of the visibility of the interference pattern (rather than the width of the interference bands that Bohr used in his reasoning). Thus, whenever these states can be completely distinguished, that is, if the slit through which the particles pass can be determined with certainty, the visibility of the interference pattern also vanishes. For an actual (and not only Gedanken) experiment of precisely this sort see [15] .
Given assumption (b), both widths, the distinguishability of the momenta and the visibility of the interference pattern, physically represent spatial resolutions of position measurements. That a momentum measurement can be construed as a position measurement was argued above; that a measurement of the visibility of the interference pattern can be so construed follows from a simple analysis of interferometry: there, visibility is defined as a function of the intensity of the beams, which, in turn, is a function of the spatial displacement of the mirrors that constitute the interferometer [76] . As shown in [48] , the two resolutions are dependent since the visibility is proportional to the matrix element which is a direct measure of the distinguishability of the momentum states of the screen.
One issue still requires careful attention, namely, how can we explain that, if for any pair of consecutive measurements the commutator fundamentally never vanishes, there are nevertheless many such pairs for which -at least for all practical purposes -the commutator appears to vanish.
Over-Description
Assumption (a) may look at first far too radical, as its combination with (b) seems to make any pair of consecutive measurements strictly non commuting. The key, however, to the reconciliation the above physical underpinning of relation (6) with classical mechanics (where measurements always commute), or with the case of commuting operators in QM, i.e., where there are no interference terms, lies in the following operational interpretation of commutativity as a manifestation of the over-description of the discrete by the continuous. This over-description is germane to all our theories, QM included, which employ a mathematical machinery that has much more structure than is required to model physics. Consequently, a lot of effort is spent in disabling or reinterpreting these redundancies, so that the modeling can be done in spite of them. I suggest to view commutativity as yet another example of such an over-description. In classical mechanics it represents the coarse grained character of classical spatial resolution, which is presumably infinite. Spatial measurements can be regarded, from a coarse grained perspective, as if they are done with infinite resolution, and consequently one can make the inaccuracies thereof arbitrarily small. Mathematically this means that classical measurement errors, while possible, are just a practical nuisance that can be compensated for and eliminated by arbitrarily enlarging the scope of the physical description without cost. Operationally, commutativity ensues from the fact that infinite precision is allowed, and so fundamentally there is no bound on physical resources involved in the measurement process. Consecutive measurements in classical mechanics thus appear to be (and so can be described as) independent of each other's inaccuracies for all practical purposes.
In QM the situation is no different. Here commutativity represents the operational independence of any two measurements, or their compatibility. Contrary to the uncertainty relations, or, say, to the case of any two consecutive orthogonal spin measurements, in those cases where measurements commute, the accuracy (or lack thereof) in one does not depend on the accuracy (or lack thereof) in the other. From the operational perspective developed here, this independence can arise in two types of scenarios. First, the physical process of construing, or performing at least one of the measurements as a position measurement involves, as a matter of fact, correlations with more degrees of freedom, and leads, as in the classical case, to a similar spatial coarse graining (think, for example, on temperature measurement with an analog thermometer whose scale is too coarse to represent minute errors in position). Such coarse grainingcommonly referred to as "Decoherence" -makes the measurements practically insensitive to the respective inaccuracies in the spatial resolution. Second, a temporal coarse graining is also possible, where commutativity is achieved in the so called "thermodynamic limit", i.e., in an extremely (ideally infinite) long measurement process, as in the quantum adiabatic theorem ( [61] , p. 739-746), or in the so called "protective measurement" scenarios [2] .
The crucial point is that in both types of coarse graining one can treat the inaccuracies in spatial resolution as if they are arbitrarily small, hence -for all practical purposes -one can describe the pair of consecutive measurements as commuting.
This reasoning suggests that while the above physical underpinning of the uncertainty relations is indeed radical, there is a way to make it consistent with the classical or the quantum formalism, and with the predictions of both theories, at least in the non relativistic domain (the generalization to the relativistic domain may be more involved, but certainly not a priori impossible). The price, as hinted above, is that non relativistic QM is now seen as phenomenological, "effective" theory, whose mathematical structure (the Hilbert space), rather than a fundamental structure that requires "an interpretation", is actually a mere set of ideal analytical tools for computing the probabilities of future states of an underlying deterministic and discrete process, from the (inherently) limited information we can have about that process. We shall say more on the consequences of this view in the final section.
Disturbance?
Heisenberg, we recall, attributed the non commutativity in the uncertainty relations to the measurement act of the position of the particle and the "disturbance" incurred thereby to its subsequent momentum. This attribution was later criticized for resurrecting the specter of hidden-variables. Lacking an alternative, non epistemic, justification, the uncertainty relations remained a mathematical theorem, a by-product of the structure of the Hilbert space.
The purpose of this chapter was to suggest a finitist underpinning of the uncertainty relations (section 7). Together with the possibility proofs that reproduce the empirical content of non relativistic QM from an underlying discrete structure based on finite measurement resolution ( [40] ) I argue that this underpinning can be considered precisely such a viable alternative, and can render quantum probabilities objective and non epistemic.
This alternative starts from measurement outcomes and their finite resolution, and seeks to reconstruct non commutativity (or the non Boolean structure of quantum probability) from these outcomes. As such, it practically moots the question of hidden-variables, and renders any other question regarding the "meaning of the wave function" a red herring, exchanging as it does the "disturbance" of the particle's state with a "disturbance" of the spatial resolution of the consecutive measurement, irrespective of the particle's state.
On the finitist view developed here, what matters is the state space of measurement outcomes, now taken as primitive, and not the metaphysics of the quantum state. As long as the non commutativity between consecutive spatial measurements is preserved, the structure of this state space of measurement outcomes allows for non Boolean probabilities [67] . That such an operationalist view (which elevates finite-resolution measurement outcomes into the status of the basic building blocks of the theory) is agnostic of metaphysics is by no means an argument against it, as long as it succeeds in reproducing from these building blocks, under certain conditions, the probabilistic predictions of QM and the structure of the Hilbert space that encodes them.
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For this reason, the finitist is immune to the standard critique of the semi-classical analysis of the entire class of thought experiments that followed Bohr and Rosenfeld, which relied on Heisenberg's "disturbance" view. This criticism, namely, that the "disturbance" view assumes the very classical ontology it purports to deny, can be blocked by noting that the said "disturbance" is not a disturbance of the existing-yet-unknown state, but a modification of the spatial resolution of the consecutive (position) measurement. This shift in reference is what allows the finitist to replace the epistemic notion of probability with an objective alternative, in which probabilities are interpreted not as degrees of belief resulting from subjective lack of knowledge of an existing reality, but as genuine physical transition probabilities between any two measurement outcomes.
To repeat, this objective view of probability is completely agnostic with respect to metaphysical questions such as "does a physical system possesses a definite state when not measured?". The only thing that matters is that the probabilities in the model match the empirical frequencies we observe in the classical as well as in the quantum domains (depending as they do on the finite or infinite spatial resolutions that underly the respective probability structures), and the difference between the two domains is seen as a difference in probability measure (Boolean vs. non Boolean), rather than a difference in ontology (hidden-variables vs. no hidden-variables).
This reasoning also changes the way we think about quantum proba-bilities: on the view proposed here, and following Heisenberg's and Dirac's intuition from 1926, these now result form an inherent (as opposed to merely practical) lack of precision in measurement, and are dynamical transition probabilities between any two measurement outcomes, and as such qualify as an objective alternative to subjective view of non relativistic QM.
Concluding with a historical perspective, it is noteworthy that, at least until he was swayed by Bohr, Dirac presumably entertained a similar agnostic intuition ( [19] , p. 347), as he displayed no worries about the system's possibly having (at any given time) definite coordinates x and p, as long as these were represented as matrices and not as numbers. On this view, his theory of transformations just implied that, given non commutativity, it was fundamentally impossible to predict unambiguously the state of the system at a subsequent time. Under the pressure of the Copenhagen school, Dirac was later persuaded to give up the so called "fiction" of a definite x and p, and in his later presentations of QM adopted the formal notion of "state vector" proposed by Weyl and yon Neumann, the metaphysical interpretations of which have generated no end of trouble. If this chapter has made you just a little bit more of a Copenhagen disbeliever, dear reader, then I have earned my day's work.
